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ABSTRACT
This work analyses the activities of Genoese merchant communities in 
the grain trade in western Mediterranean markets. Our goal is to shed 
light on their ability to integrate into foreign lands, taking advantage 
of their privileged position within the Spanish Crown. Our analysis is 
focussed on two case studies, strictly connected from a theoretical 
point of view: Sicily and Tabarka. Both Genoese minorities living on 
these two islands used the port of Genoa as their commercial hub. 
Regarding Sicily, this study has mostly drawn information from a yet 
unexploited source: general average procedures drawn up in Genoa. 
General average (GA) was (and still is nowadays) a legal instrument 
used in maritime trade to share between all parties involved the 
expenses which can befall ships and cargoes from the time of their 
loading aboard until their unloading (due to accidents, jettison, etc.). 
These documents have been collected in an online database soon to 
be published as part of the ERC-funded AveTransRisk project. They offer 
valuable insights on shipmasters and merchants, cargo values, ports 
of destination, wheat prices, etc. All the sources are available on the 
online database resulting from the AveTransRisk project, of which we 
are members (http://humanities-research.exeter.ac.uk/avetransrisk). For 
the trade in North African wheat, we have mostly used documents 
related to the Genoese ‘colony’ of Tabarka, administered by the Lomellini 
family. These sources are kept in the Genoese archives as well as in the 
Archives Nationales of Paris.
1. Introduction
Some scholars call the early modern period the age of the first globalisation (O’Rourke & 
Williamson, 2002). This was characterised by significant changes in international trade pat-
terns, brought about by the opening of new trade routes and the entry of new players. At 
the same time, peripheral or secondary markets became more and more attractive to com-
munities of merchants linked to traditional Mediterranean markets. The new geography of 
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Mediterranean commercial routes offered multiple ports of call for the export of hinterland 
products. These ports were connected with the main hubs and redistribution centres 
(Blockmans et al., 2017, pp. 8–9). This system, particularly evident for the grain trade, would 
in turn determine or favour a more or less stable settlement of merchants belonging to 
foreign minorities. As underlined by F. Braudel, such minorities were characterised whether 
by nationality or by religion and they had a tendency «to stick together, for mutual aid and 
self-defence: when abroad, a Genoese merchant would back up his fellow-citizen, an 
Armenian a fellow-Armenian» (Braudel, 1982, p. 166). They also maintained a network of 
relations with their home territories, and often showed common and recognisable features 
(Harlaftis et al., 2012; Jarvis & Lee, 2008).
Scholars often linked the concept of minority to that of ‘diaspora’. Recent studies by 
Francesca Trivellato, Guillaume Calafat and Wolfgang Kaiser have shed light on the role of 
diasporic minorities characterised by religious as well as political and cultural alterity 
(Trivellato, 2009; Calafat & Kaiser, 2014). In general, three key features characterise a diaspora: 
geographical dispersion, orientation towards a real or imaginary homeland, and specific 
identity.1 Genoese merchant communities who settled throughout Europe from the end of 
the fifteenth century fully correspond to this theoretical framework.2 These communities 
became increasingly influential in the early modern period by adding financial activities to 
their traditional mercantile activities. G. Arrighi, for example, uses the expressions ‘Genoese 
cosmopolitan business diaspora’ and ‘Genoese capitalist diaspora’ with reference to the 
financial network of Genoese businessmen stretching across the Mediterranean and 
Northern Europe in the early modern period (Arrighi, 2005). This process and, more generally, 
financial activities by Genoese patricians, have long been the subject of numerous studies, 
which, however, have often ignored parallel mercantile activities carried out by the same 
businessmen (Felloni, 1999a). Regarding grain trade, in particular, E. Grendi pointed out that 
the Genoese were always willing to buy grain or accept all kinds of bread substitutes, and 
that shipmasters from Genoa and its region were the brokers of the Genoese diaspora 
(Grendi, 1968, p. 609). Statements like this clearly confirm that wheat and its trade on inter-
national markets were quite important for the Genoese diasporic minorities settled across 
the Mediterranean.
As is well known, starting from the severe famine in 1590–1591, the merchants of North-
Western Europe entered into Mediterranean trade, slowly gaining a significant share of its 
overall traffic. They relegated local merchant ships to a secondary role (Perrson, 2004). 
However, the new grain trade axis between Northern and Southern Europe did not cause 
the immediate decline of Mediterranean supply centres. During the beginning of the 
Seventeenth century, for example, Sicily enjoyed new vitality as a traditional wheat export 
area, also thanks to the presence of a dynamic Genoese community.3 In addition, the Genoese 
managed to open a new route for wheat from the island of Tabarka, which served as a redis-
tribution centre for the goods arriving from Tunisian coasts. This route, although character-
ised by small volumes of traffic, played a complementary function on the Genoese market. 
Large and small Mediterranean islands were important transit points and stopovers on the 
main merchant routes. In many cases, they provided additional functions that can be 
included into the ‘widespread portuality’ concept proposed by Biagio Salvemini.4 Our goal 
is to compare the two case studies in order to demonstrate the skills of the Genoese merchant 
minorities in developing different business models according to the political and economic 
features of the foreign market where they settled.
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Grain shipped with the collaboration of Genoese communities living abroad used to 
supply a large part of the Tyrrhenian area and beyond. Both islands, Sicily and Tabarka, were 
formally under the rule of the Spanish crown. However, this authority was weak and left a 
high degree of autonomy to the private initiative of the trading nations, something referred 
to by M.H. Sanchez as a polycentric model of shared sovereignty (Brilli & Sanchez, 2019). In 
Sicily, the Genoese accounted for one of the main ‘nations’, with close connections with the 
local government and a semi-monopoly on Sicilian wheat exports granted by the Viceroyalty.5 
In 1543, the Lomellini, through their close relations with the Spanish Crown, were entrusted 
with the coral fishing business in the small estate of Tabarka, in the heart of the North African 
Regencies, which they would run until 1741. A slow coral reef depletion progressively forced 
Genoese entrepreneurs to diversify their business into the more consistently profitable wheat 
trade. They purchased wheat on the local markets and exported it from Tabarka to Genoa. 
The Governor of the island managed this trade on behalf of the Lomellini family with the 
help of a small number of intermediaries. The Genoese-Tabarkan community was integrated 
into the local Muslim society: even though they were an ethnic-religious minority, they were 
treated as ‘simple guests, non-dangerous neighbours’, with whom the local authorities could 
do business and from whom they could collect tributes (Piccinno, 2008, p. 16).
2. The Genoese minority in Sicilian grain trade
Sicilian wheat production in the early modern period exceeded domestic demand. Wheat 
was the core element of the regional economy: an agricultural monoculture largely aimed 
at export in exchange for finished products, such as textiles and iron. This scheme of trade, 
defined by many historians as a ‘colonial or semi-colonial economy’, would seem to imply 
the subordination of the Sicilian economy to the one of Northern Italy.6 However, according 
to D. Abulafia it does not fit for the early modern period:
To describe this balance of interests as a contrast between a ‘developed’ North and an ‘under-
developed’ South would be to employ loaded terms; in the Middle Ages, was it more ‘underde-
veloped’ to be lacking in regular famines or to be lacking in large-scale industry? (Abulafia, 
1981, p. 388).
Factors such as the increasing role played by foreign merchants and bankers and the 
absence of a powerful merchant navy between the Middle Ages and the early modern period 
shaped the internal structure of the regional economy during the Fifteenth century (Aymard 
& Giarrizzo, 1987). The Spanish Crown, who formally held power after Charles V’s ascent to 
the throne in 1516, controlled a monopoly market. Grain trade kept its primacy throughout 
the early modern period.7
Foreign merchant groups would dominate exports. The Genoese, in particular, not only 
handled large parts of the wheat trade, but also made significant and relatively secure profits 
by controlling financial capital and credit.8 young sons of leading Genoese patrician families 
went to Sicily to learn the mercantile and financial profession. The prosperity of this important 
community depended on its ability to win the favour of local authorities and nobility. The 
Genoese in Sicily were entrepreneurs and landowners, bankers, wholesalers, insurers, shop-
keepers, attorneys; they would lend money, grant funds to the government, and often suc-
ceeded in acquiring Sicilian noble titles (Corrao, 1994). In addition to fostering good relations 
with the local government, this strategy would help create better links with the inhabitants. 
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Loans were often repaid with the sale of annuities, accounting or financial services, or even 
with marriage contracts between Sicilian noblewomen and Genoese businessmen’s sons.9 
Family lineage and belonging to the same Catholic community were further elements that 
helped their integration into Sicilian society. This is why it is often difficult to identify the 
Genoese minority outside their logge or churches, namely the traditional spaces of the 
‘nation’.10 yet, the Genoese did not lose their identity nor their bond with Genoa. They main-
tained consuls in the main cities of the island, Palermo and Messina, appointing them 
through a complex procedure informed by internal divisions within the patrician class in 
Genoa, namely between Old and New Nobles.11 Palermo, the capital of the Viceroyalty, was 
the main Genoese settlement where they took up a whole neighbourhood. Based on Palermo 
marriage contracts, this city ‘minority’ amounted to about 3000 individuals, out of a total 
population of about 110,000 inhabitants.12 Among them, many were engaged in mercantile 
activities. For the 1601–1605 five-year period, for example, out of 985 foreign merchants 
residing in Palermo, 60% were Genoese, 15% Catalans, 11% Florentines, plus 14% of other 
nationalities (Cancila, 1980, pp. 252–254). The dominant character of the Genoese minority 
is clear, at least from a quantitative point of view. Taking advantage of the presence of family 
members and clientele networks in Genoa and the whole Mediterranean, many merchants 
would specialise in the wheat trade. Palermo was indeed the centre of negotiations for the 
wheat cultivated in the surrounding region. Here, merchants bought export licences from 
state authorities and dispatched their agents to load wheat in the peripheral centres.
Their long-term settlement and strong relations with the local community favoured the 
Genoese minority in dealing with the main obstacles linked to the grain trade such as, for 
example, significant price fluctuations in the Sicilian market. Their deep local roots also 
prevented other minorities from joining the market. For example, the Raynolts, German 
merchants living in Genoa and specialising in the grain trade between the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth centuries, failed to effectively penetrate into Sicily because of the Genoese 
presence (Lamberti, 1972, pp. 79, 93–97).
To understand the role of this minority in the grain trade in Sicily and their dominant 
position, it is necessary to examine the organisational structure that controlled the connec-
tion between production and market, as well as the role of the Spanish Crown and its officials. 
A type of durum wheat, roccella, was the most important variety of wheat for export (Macrì, 
2010, 93). Wheat harvesting and distribution relied on a system of ports of loading called 
caricatori, that specialised in this trade.13 These ports, limited in number to favour the cen-
tralisation of exports, had large, closely monitored warehouses to avoid smuggling (Blando, 
2008). They were either under the direct authority of the Crown, the local nobility, or the 
Sicilian senate. The main royal ports involved in the grain trade were Sciacca, Girgenti (pres-
ent-day Agrigento), Licata, and Termini Imerese. They were at the centre of policies on grain 
and an example of a centralised redistribution economy as theorised by Polanyi (1978). They 
played a crucial role in influencing the behaviour of merchants, who found the wheat ready 
for loading on ships without having to worry about its transport from the hinterland. In this 
way, fewer brokers were involved and merchants had more time to devote to managing 
their relations and making negotiations with the central authorities in the cities. In ports, 
wheat was kept separate from other cargos and subjected to specific safeguards. Storage 
was free for farmers, while the warehouse’s owners would make their proceeds from cresci-
monie, the natural process whereby wheat increases in weight in the first year since harvest 
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(Laudani, 2008, p. 483). If unsold, the owner could still keep it in storage for another year by 
paying a fee. It was therefore worth selling the harvest within the first year.
From 1338, the Aragonese administration pooled the administration of all royal ports 
under a single authority, the Maestro Portolano. A prammatica dated 1604 added the posi-
tion of Viceportolano in charge of the local warehouses in each port (Laudani (2008, p. 478, 
484). The Maestro Portolano lived in Palermo and was responsible for issuing export permits, 
called tratte, granted by the government against payment of a specific tax, the jus exiturae. 
Leading merchants on the island often managed to achieve this position, thus supporting 
the state’s need to maximise wheat sales and collect as many revenues as possible from 
the selling of tratte (Trasselli, 1977). Prices, just like customs duties and the salary of Maestro 
Portolano, depended on harvests and were calculated on production forecasts, called mete 
(Testa, 1741, pp. 372–373). The price of tratte ranged depending on different factors and, 
over time, new taxes were added.14 Wheat was therefore a key asset for Sicily and for the 
Spanish imperial system.
Opportunities from wheat exports attracted many foreign merchants, especially Italians 
and Catalans, who in return brought clothes, iron, spices, and other goods. Genoese mer-
chants set up companies to buy tratte and share the profits (Trasselli, 1972, p. 61). The 
Genoese minority in Sicily, closely linked to both the local and Spanish courts, needed state 
authorities’ support to win the competition and get the tratte. The Spanish monarchy would 
favour, or at least did not hinder, Genoese dominance in this trade, which had previously 
been in the hands of the Catalans (Dauverd, 2006). Genoese attempts to monopolise the 
position of Maestro Portolano reflect their interest in this sector. In 1542, Ottavio Spinola, 
one of the leading Genoese merchants in Sicily, bought the position of Maestro Portolano 
from Viceroy Ferrante Gonzaga and kept it, together with the roles of Tesoriere and Pretore 
of Palermo, until 1571.15 A few years later, Vincenzo Spinola, senator of the Sicilian parliament 
and a relative of Ottavio, held the same position several times between 1582 and 1596. He 
was deprived of it for fraudulent behaviour due to his frequent collusions with other mer-
chants.16 Another Spinola, Pietro, became Maestro Portolano between 1601 and 1608.17 
Spinola’s monopoly was probably an incentive for the other Genoese merchants engaged 
in the Sicilian grain trade. Indeed, by looking at the list of fideiussori per le esportazioni 
between 1544 and 1563, Genoese family names like Pinello, Adorno, Lomellino, De Franchis, 
Fiesco, De Nigroni, Cibò, Doria, usodimare, Giustiniani, Costa, Spinola, Centurione, Lercaro, 
Imperiale, Innardo, and others are frequently included. Fideiussori would live in Sicily and 
were in charge of guaranteeing for fair conduct of exporting merchants with Maestro 
Portolano.18
The importance of the Genoese merchant community in Sicily is evident also from an 
analysis of data extrapolated from GA procedures drawn up in Genoa. GA is a way to share 
voluntary damages suffered during a shipping expedition, such as jettison or the cutting 
of the mast, among all participants, for the common safety. Damages are proportionally 
shared, according to each party’s interest in the voyage. The procedure would normally 
include a shipmaster’s report, relevant calculations, and, sometimes, various attached 
documents, such as bills of lading and estimates. Any shipmaster arriving in Genoa, regard-
less of his nationality, could submit a GA report. GA sources are relatively reliable. According 
to preliminary estimates made by G. Felloni based on GA reports submitted between 1599 
and 1601, about 60% of the vessels arriving in Genoa with a capacity exceeding 76 tons 
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submitted a report (Felloni, 1999b, p. 851). For this reason, the data emerging from this 
source well exemplify maritime traffic trends.
As part of the AveTransRisk project, Genoese GA documentation have been entered in an 
online database.19 Due to the high volume of available sources, the database is organised 
by sample years. This in turn has determined the selection of the years examined here. The 
chosen periods are: 1590–1592, 1598–1601, 1638–1641. During the first one, the famine 
struck the Mediterranean and favoured the arrival of Northern ships loaded with cereals, a 
phase which ended around 1597. Between 1598 and 1601 there was a market readjustment, 
with the restoration of the ‘traditional’ supply routes. The third period is in the midst of the 
Thirty years’ War, a period of change for both the international political scenario, and the 
main traffic routes (Grendi 1971, p. 31). The cases concerning wheat shipments are 209 out 
of 512 recorded and their frequency is relatively homogeneous over the sample years. They 
were operated by shipmasters of different nationalities calling at the port of Genoa.
In the long term, Sicily was found to be the first region of origin of ships loaded with 
wheat and submitting a GA report on their arrival in Genoa, despite the importance that 
areas such as Northern Europe or other Italian regions would progressively assume in the 
Seventeenth century. Table 1 shows the origins of vessels calling at Genoa in the examined 
timeframes. The number of vessels coming from Sicily, although variable, is always relevant. 
The first period, 1590–1592, is strongly influenced by the aforementioned famine, so that in 
these years the quantity of vessels from Northern Europe exceeded those from Sicily by 11%. 
From the years 1598–1601, however, there is a significant increase in arrivals from Sicily, with 
72 vessels, accounting for 79% of the total. The years when Pietro Spinola was Maestro 
Portolano (1601–1608) partly coincide with the years with the most frequent arrivals, thus 
confirming the close connection between institutional and commercial monopolies. More 
arrivals most likely corresponded with higher quantities of wheat. By comparing the tonnage 
of vessels from Northern Europe and Sicily between 1590 and 1641, no significant differences 
were found between Mediterranean and Northern ships, both having extremely wide range 
of values. The third timeframe includes arrivals between 1638 and 1641, in the middle of the 
Thirty years’ War. Genoese merchants took advantage of Genoa’s neutrality to continue 
trading with different markets, buying wheat from Apulia, Veneto, Lazio, and Calabria 
(Trasselli, 1972). The emerging trends resulting from further studies of GA reports between 
the end of the Seventeenth and beginning of the Eighteenth century confirm the importance 
of the Sicilian market for Genoa. On the other side, imports from Tabarka and Calabria were 
also growing (Salvemini, 2009).
A clear continuity and preference for royal ports is evident when looking at the ports of 
loading used by the Genoese in Sicily. These were the most active in wheat exports (Laudani, 
2008, p. 486). It further confirms the importance of keeping good relations with Maestro 
Portolano and the role of the Genoese minority residing in Palermo, even after the end of 
Spinola’s monopoly. Shipments to Genoa usually departed from Sciacca, Girgenti or Termini 
Imerese, respectively in 34%, 21% and 28% of cases. Shipmasters could also load their ships 
in more than one port. For example, in 1600, Antonio Maria Germano of Sestri Ponente 
loaded wheat at Girgenti and then, after a jettison during a storm, loaded more wheat in 
Trapani.20 The voyages could also include a call at Palermo or Messina to load more valuable 
merchandise, such as silk, wine, or sugar.21 In most cases, however, wheat was carried on 
vessels exclusively used for this purpose. Since, as already mentioned, it was a highly per-
ishable product, vessels would sail with only few, if any, scheduled stops.
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Grain trade does not seem to have been affected by the seasons, although the data 
examined show that departures were more concentrated between September and May. This 
was probably because harvest season started in June and shipments were ready starting 
from September. However, GA calculations often indicate that the wheat on board came 
«from the old harvest», so dependence on seasonal variables must have been negligible.22 
On the other hand, concentrated arrivals of ships would have raised some problems, as, for 
example, was the case with the ships travelling in convoy from Northern Europe: i.e. price 
drops at the place of sale, due to supply surplus, and difficulties in finding return cargo due 
to increased traffic.
Genoese merchants in Sicily would probably employ any shipmaster who offered cheap 
freights, regardless of his nationality. GA reports include this information for 62 voyages 
from Sicily, more than 50% of the total. The results regarding shipmasters’ nationalities are 
interesting. For example, from GA reports concerning wheat shipments from Sicily between 
1590 and the early 1600s, shipmasters from the Republic of Ragusa prevailed, while Northern 
or French shipmasters clearly replaced them during the Seventeenth century (Kuncevic, 
2017). C. Trasselli reports that in the 1601–1635 period most of the foreign ships calling at 
Sicilian ports were French (39%), followed by Dutch (9%), while in the 1640s there was an 
increase in the presence of Dutch (23%) and English (9%) vessels (Trasselli, 1965). Data on 
GA shipmasters show that many of them came from Provence and Liguria. Eight Provençal 
shipmasters came from the villages of Saint-Tropez and Six-Fours-les-Plages, while ten 
Ligurian shipmasters came from Cogoleto and Arenzano.
We have compared the prices that Genoese merchants paid for wheat in Sicily, frequently 
reported in GA calculations. These calculations took into account the worth of each cargo 
item, plus that of the ship and freights. The tax on wheat paid in Genoa and the cost of freight 
amounted to about 2 lire and 1.5 lire per mina, respectively. Figure 1 brings together the 
prices in Genoese lire for the purchase of one mina of the main types of Sicilian wheat.23 As 
confirmed by G. Macrì’s studies, reliance on different types of wheat, like rocella or carosella, 
two types of durum wheat, was an effective risk reduction strategy, successfully adopted by 
the Genoese. Should there be a poor harvest of rocella wheat in a certain year, it was still 
possible to purchase another type of wheat or vice versa (Macrì, 2010, p. 93).
Two phases can be identified in price trends. In the first period, between approximately 
1589 and early 1599, prices were sharply fluctuating. The price of rocella wheat in 1590, for 
example, was more than 30 Genoese lire per mina. This period coincided with the famine 
and the subsequent ‘Northern invasion’, which helped to overcome the crisis by ensuring 
Table 1. no. of vessels loaded with wheat reporting a GA in Genoa, 1590–1641.
origin 1590–1592 1598–1601 1638–1641
Sicily 9 72 21
Northern Europe 12 4
Apulia 2 19
Veneto 10
Tabarka 1 1 4




Other 3 11 17
total 26 91 92
source: AveTransRisk database.
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regular imports (Grendi, 1970, 117–120). This did not prevent strong price fluctuations in 
the short term, in Genoa as well as in Sicily, with similar trends.24 Based on the data provided 
by G. Felloni, the price of wheat in Genoa in 1591 almost doubled, compared to the one of 
the previous year. Prices returned to pre-crisis levels only within four years, with a price of 
16 Genoese lire per mina (Felloni & Pesce, 1975, p. 293). Further fluctuations, although less 
significant, marked the following years, with an average price of 18 lire per mina. In the 
second phase, starting from the end of 1599, prices in Sicily stabilised around an average 
of 16 lire until the beginning of the Eighteenth century, when the trend began to show 
again marked fluctuations. Standard deviation, i.e. the statistical dispersion index, was about 
1.8 lire. Hence, using average prices should be sufficiently reliable. It also confirms that the 
Genoese minority could buy wheat at ‘stable’ prices.25 Even in this phase, the prices in Genoa 
follow a regular trend: after a peak between 1640s and 1650s, they stabilised at 23 lire from 
1670 (Felloni & Pesce, 1975, p. 293).
When the GA documentation includes the bill of lading and/or the damage apportion-
ment calculation, and therefore the list of merchants involved in grain trade, as sellers or 
buyers, it is possible to identify the dominant presence of the Genoese. Some names are 
recurrent, especially in the 1598–1601 timeframe, when there were 42 calculations. Some 
specialisation degree can be observed among those who shipped goods from Sicily, with 
recurring names such as Spinola, Cigala, De Ferrari, Di Negro, Rogali, Roccatagliata, De 
Franchi, Interiano, Groppo, Squarciafico, Fieschi, Pallavicino, Mainardo, Cavanna, Brignone. 
Based on GA calculations, the Cavanna were the most active with six voyages.26 These 
voyages show the modus operandi of a Genoese family whose core business was grain trade 
in Sicily. Niccolò and Paolo Battista Cavanna, in Palermo, usually traded with Giulio Cavanna 
and brothers in Genoa.27 Each voyage involved different shipmasters and vessels, sailing 
from the north and south-west coast of the island, the so-called ‘Sicily of wheat’ (Blando, 
2003). Ships departed throughout the whole year and sailed straight to Genoa, although 
GA events encountered along the route would force them to make unplanned calls at other 
ports. In two cases, the Cavanna operated alone, renting a vessel to carry rocella wheat to 
Genoa. They resorted to the brokers Luigi di Negro and Gio Batta Porta. Several branches 
of the aristocratic Di Negro family were involved in the Sicilian trade (Avallone et al., 2016). 
The Cavanna of Palermo would even deal in and sell rocella wheat «from the old harvest» 
Figure 1. Purchase price for 1 mina of sicilian wheat in Genoese lire, 1589–1703.
source: AveTransRisk database.
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directly to the Ufficio dell’Abbondanza, Genoa’s authority in charge of the Annona.28 The 
Cavanna cooperated with Genoese merchants in Palermo for the shipment of San Giovanni 
Battista Buonaventura. Among them was Gio. Girolamo Interiano, Genoese consul in 
Palermo. They would also act as middlemen for other merchants of their ‘nation’. This was 
the case, for example, for the shipment of rocella wheat ordered by Marco Antonio Sestri 
and Vincenzo Pini from Giorgenti to Genoa. A long-term presence, close contacts with 
institutions and with other members of the minority, a preference for certain ports and 
their ability to obtain ‘stable’ prices are some of the reasons behind the success of the 
Genoese minority in Sicilian grain trade, and the Cavanna family exemplifies all these 
characteristics.
3. The Genoese ‘colony’ of Tabarka: Business strategies of the Lomellini’s firm
Since the end of the Sixteenth century, Genoese merchants involved in the grain trade in 
the Mediterranean sailed along less important and subsiduary routes than those followed 
by Northern European shippers. However, these routes were essential for the sustenance of 
the population which, during the early modern period, was slowly growing. In addition to 
resuming exports from Sicily, a new ‘grain route’ was opened up from the Tunisian island of 
Tabarka thanks to the entrepreneurial initiative of the Lomellini.
Located a few hundred metres off the Tunisian coast, from the second half of the Sixteenth 
century this island became a hub in the European grain trade network. Genoese businessmen 
created a cohesive and stable community on this small land, which was a natural meeting 
point between Christianity and the Muslim world. Our aim here is to analyse the strategic 
and operational solutions of a firm which, as shown later, voluntarily moved its core business 
from coral fishing and marketing to trading in Barbary wheat.
First, it is necessary to look at the context where the firm had been operating for about 
two centuries. The island’s location, the economy of the surrounding area and its unique 
political-administrative features are key. Tabarka is a very small island, 800 metres long, 500 
metres wide, with an almost 4 kilometres long coastline. It is located within a gulf bordered 
to the west by Capo Rosso, near the border with Algeria, and to the east by Capo Negro, in a 
stretch of sea renowned, already in the Middle Ages, for its rich red coral shoals. There are 
two natural moorings. Due to its mountainous and rough terrain it is unsuitable for agricul-
ture. Conversely, the Krumiria region in the mainland opposite Tabarka is relatively rich in 
water and, therefore, suitable for growing cereals (Mantran, 1977).
until the Eighteenth century, the Spanish Crown maintained formal ownership of Tabarka: 
the fortress on the island was part of the defensive network of watchtowers and outposts 
scattered along the North African coasts, originally established by Charles V. These bases 
served to prevent Algerian pirates from attacking Christian ships, while controlling their 
French enemy and its relations with the Ottoman Empire. Tabarka’s strategic importance is 
confirmed by France’s interest in it. France already controlled strongholds a few kilometres 
away (the so-called Bastion de France, near La Calle, and Capo Negro), but even England tried 
to get possession of the island.29
In the years since Genoa had entered into the sphere of influence of the Habsburg mon-
archy, during the Sixteenth century, the foundations were laid for the establishment of what 
would in fact become a Genoese ‘colony’ in Tabarka. Admiral Andrea Doria, appointed captain 
of the Catholic King’s fleet, obtained the independence for Genoa and military protection 
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from the imperial troops in case of enemy attack. Despite its undeniable military weakness, 
the Republic of Genoa rallied resources that derived from the many economic activities 
privately conducted by the powerful city oligarchy: from the organisation and management 
of a complex financial and credit system, to shipping and to multiple merchant activities 
(Braudel, 1984). From 1543, the Spanish Crown formally granted the Lomellini – one of the 
most important patrician families in Genoa – the right to establish a stable settlement for 
coral fishing in Tabarka. They would later be known as Lomellini-Tabarchini because of their 
link with the island. Beyond them, also some members of the Grimaldi family were involved, 
who, however, left the enterprise around 1570. under the asiento contract, the Lomellini 
were required to pay a ‘rent’ to the Spanish Crown in exchange for this concession. Such rent 
was proportional to the amount of harvested red coral, and to the expenses incurred to keep 
the fortress and the military garrison running. In the following decades, the Crown would 
several times renew the initially five-year contract, although never with a fixed schedule. 
Tacit renewals were frequent. The key clauses in the contract were never significantly 
amended. The last one was signed in 1695. The firm survived until 1741, when the Tunisian 
Bey ordered the invasion of the island.30
In the early modern Mediterranean, the Lomellini’s firm had unique features for several 
reasons: an atypical political context underlying its very existence, its exceptionally long 
existence – about two centuries – but also its business structure and evolution. Following 
the finalisation of the asiento, the Lomellini promoted the settlement on the island of about 
300 fishermen, most of them coming from Pegli, a small village near Genoa where they had 
vast estates.31 The Genoese community grew over time and gave rise to a real settlement 
which, at the beginning of the Eighteenth century, had about 1200–1300 inhabitants: in 
addition to the fortress and other fortifications, there was a parish church, a hospital, a square 
tower, the arsenal and a few windmills (Vallacca, 1769–1787, pp. 1–7).
A Governor, generally another Genoese nobleman, directly appointed by the Lomellini, 
was in charge of running both the settlement and the firm. He had to swear allegiance to 
the Spanish ambassador in Genoa, but he followed directives received from Genoa, where 
the Lomellini resided. He controlled seven officers and their subordinates, for a total of about 
twenty people, and periodically sent the firm’s accounting books to Genoa. He provided the 
necessary tools for coral harvesting, distributed free wine and oil to the inhabitants – whose 
sustenance fell entirely on the firm – and presided over the activity of local ovens and bread 
distribution. The Governor was in charge of managing the relations with the Beys of Algiers 
and Tunis and paying tributes to them. With the help of intermediaries, he bought Barbary 
products to ship to Genoa both by trading with the merchants who reached the island and 
by personally going to Tunis and the nearby villages (Vallacca, pp. 17).
In order to trade and fish without risks, keeping friendly relations with the nearby Muslim 
population was essential. For this reason, apart from taxes levied by the regencies of Algiers 
and Tunis, the Lomellini would also pay duties to the chiefs of the four tribes settled on the 
mainland near the island. In return, they agreed to keep peace with the Genoese and sell 
them their goods at attractive prices. Through these agreements, the Tabarchini were allowed 
to move to the neighbouring regions to carry out their trade, while Muslims and Ottomans 
were allowed on the island. During its first decades, red coral fishing and its sale in Genoa 
was the almost exclusive highly profitable business of the firm. Over time, it began to exploit 
the island’s strategic position to trade with neighbouring regions, which produced wheat 
and other types of cereals, broad beans, oil, wax, wool, and leather. As a matter of fact, 
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Maghrebian ports were at the centre of a commercial network targeting the European mar-
ket, which the Lomellini penetrated successfully. As discussed by S. Boubaker, «au début du 
XVIIe siècle la caravane qui reliait périodiquement Tabarka à Tunis était devenue un événe-
ment commercial dans le Nord tunisien».32 Especially from the second half of the Seventeenth 
century, the grain trade began to play a primary role, because it was a highly profitable 
business and also due to a progressive depletion of coral reefs.
Since Spain was not interested in Tabarka, the Lomellini were allowed to control it as if it 
were a Genoese ‘colony’: it was no coincidence that the flag of the Republic of Genoa was 
flying on the fortress. However, the growth in grain trade attracted the Crown’s attention. 
Between the end of the 1660s and the early 1670s, the Spanish Governor of Milan and other 
royal officials in Italy would send reports to Madrid complaining that their businesses and 
trade with their colonies were suffering from Lomellini’s competition in Tabarka. For this 
reason, in 1672 the Spanish King Charles II charged the Supremo Consiglio d’Italia33 with the 
following task: to collect information on the activities run by the Lomellini, their firm’s prof-
itability and the status of contractual relations in place between the Crown and the Genoese. 
About two years later, the Consiglio sent a report to the King. All leading representatives of 
the Crown in Italy, including the Governor of Milan and the Spanish Ambassador in Genoa, 
gave their opinion on this matter. The Viceroy of Sicily and the Viceroy of Sardinia accused 
the Lomellini family of illegally trading in Barbary wheat, an activity which in their opinion 
was not covered by the royal contracts. This trade was clearly in competition with the regions 
under their jurisdiction. The Governor of Milan suggested to enfeoff the island, namely to 
assign it permanently to new subjects; others suggested to amend the contractual clauses 
by adding an extra fee for their grain trading. However, as was already the case in previous 
disputes, the central government ignored all these requests, and the Lomellini went on 
doing their business undisturbed.34
From Genoa, the Lomellini sent many letters to the Governor of the island, from whom 
they received detailed information on the progress of the harvests and new business oppor-
tunities. By examining these letters between Governor Aurelio Spinola and Stefano and 
Pier Francesco Lomellini in the years 1683–1687, interesting information about the opera-
tional organisation of this business can be gathered.35 Other letters relating to the 1719–
1729 period provide further information.36 In these years, new business partners belonging 
to the Genoese patriciate temporarily joined the Lomellini.37
As already pointed out, the owners of the firm had a monopoly on all the activities that 
took place on the island, including both local and export trade: native inhabitants were 
not allowed to trade on their own. From their headquarters in Genoa, the Lomellini family 
relied on the Consul of the Republic in Tunis or employed trusted merchants to act as 
brokers. They would regularly send to the Governor of the island large sums of money – 
usually in pieces of eight reali and silver scudi – to purchase shipments of wheat whenever 
they thought prices to be attractive. In general, although depending on the harvest, 
Barbary wheat used to cost half the price of wheat in Italy (Braudel, 1976, p. 452, 613). 
Grains were stored in the island’s warehouses before being shipped to Genoa, where they 
were sold again or stored in the free port, waiting for buyers (Piccinno & Zanini, 2019). 
When the island’s warehouses were full and there were good profit opportunities, the 
Lomellini authorised the Governor to sell wheat directly to passing ships. As a matter of 
fact, English, French, Dutch and Spanish ships looking for good deals were often calling 
at the small port.38 In this case, due to lower local sale prices than in Genoa, profit margins 
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were still good. Further, there were no transport costs, nor taxes levied by the Genoese 
authorities;39 plus, any business risks associated with sea transport were completely 
eliminated. 
On the Genoa – Tabarka – Genoa route, the Lomellini always relied on the same shipmas-
ters, probably because of trusting relationships consolidated over time. The ships – pinchi, 
tartane, barche – with an approximate capacity of 1,000 mine, or 90 tons. each, were chartered 
in Genoa, generally for round trips. When warehouses were full, they would hire other ship-
masters for the Tabarka – Genoa route: these shipmasters were known as venturieri. The 
volume of goods directed to Genoa was almost always greater than the one in the opposite 
direction. This gap grew with the progressive shift of the company’s core business from coral 
to grain. From transporting red coral – a small and high added value item whose shipments 
to Genoa were regularly planned (generally four in a year) – the Lomellini moved to shipping 
bulky, low added value wheat. The latter was more easily perishable in case of bad weather. 
Also, the amount of wheat in the island’s warehouses waiting to be shipped depended on 
external factors. For example, in the period between October 1683 and April 1686, 56,087 
mine of wheat were loaded in the port of Tabarka, of which about 32,000 in 1684 and only 
half in the following year (Gourdin, 2008, p. 290). The cargo was usually insured in Genoa, 
and only for the Tabarka – Genoa trip; the insurance premium depended both on the capacity 
of the vessel and, above all, on the number of coral boxes to be shipped, this being the most 
valuable good on board.40 The insured sum never covered the entire value of the cargo, but 
usually only 50%–60%; in some cases this percentage was even lower, probably based on 
voyage risk assessments by the entrepreneurs and their profit margin expectations.41
Although the number of registered cases in the AveTransRisk database is just a small per-
centage of the total (15 cases out of 512), we can use GA data to collect further information 
on the route connecting Genoa and Tabarka. Of the abovementioned cases, five of them 
regard accidents that occurred during the voyage from Genoa (or other ports in Liguria) to 
the island, and 10 to return voyages. Focussing on the latter voyages, i.e. the ones involved 
in wheat shipping, the accidents due to bad weather followed by jettison or damage to the 
cargo were frequent, on average one per year. Voyages were scattered throughout the year, 
but most accidents concerned shipments leaving Tabarka in October and December, when 
sea conditions were worse. Shipmasters’ nationalities vary significantly, depending on the 
years. While at the end of the Sixteenth century they were mainly Genoese and Provençal, in 
the 1639–1641 period they were all Flemish or in any case from Northern Europe. Conversely, 
more Ligurian shipmasters were being employed at the end of the century.42 As indicated 
also in other sources, mostly kept in private family archives, in the first decades of the 
Eighteenth century, the Genoese patricians began to rely more frequently on French ship-
masters to limit attacks by Algerian pirates. Their ships, however, often had a lower capacity 
than Ligurian ships and, according to Genoese merchants, they asked for higher freights.43
As an example, let us look at the GA report dated 28th February 1696 submitted by Antonio 
Decotto from Prá, Genoese shipmaster of the ship La Madonna del Carmine, with 128 tons 
capacity. This source contains useful information about the value of loaded cargo and the 
risks that the entrepreneurs had to face. It is a ‘standard’ voyage. The value of the cargo 
amounted to about 50,000 Genoese lire: 300 mine of wheat accounted for 22,100 lire of the 
cargo – thus making an estimated price of 17 lire per mina – while the remainder comprised 
12 boxes of red coral, as well as small quantities of couscus and other foodstuff, such as broad 
beans and lentils. The freight paid for the shipment was 5,390 lire, that is, for what concerns 
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wheat, 3 lire for each mina. Due to bad weather during the journey, the captain threw 148 
mine of wheat overboard, for a value of 2,515 lire. According to calculations, the total amount 
of damages suffered by the Lomellini firm was 7,000 lire, of which 3,094 lire related to wheat.44
Further information to assess the profitability of the grain trade can be gathered from a 
report drawn up by Spanish officials before the last contract was signed in 1695.45 The main 
expenses incurred by the Lomellini were operating costs for coral harvesting and the cost 
of ensuring military protection to the island, respectively 18,000 silver scudi and 11,000 scudi 
per year, including 1,000 scudi for the Governor’s salary. Revenues from the sale of red coral 
were estimated at about 100,000 scudi, with on average about 88,000 scudi annual profit. 
According to this report, in the best years, the Lomellini could buy about 100,000 mine of 
wheat. In their opinion, the profit the Lomellini were making amounted to one scudo per 
mina when the wheat was sold in Tabarka, and between one and a half and two scudi when 
sold in Genoa. This led to profits ranging between 100,000 and 200,000 scudi per year, or, 
taking into account the exchange rate between silver scudo and Genoese lira, between 
700,000 and 1,400,000 lire.
The report highlighted the firm’s high profitability, but also the shift of the core business 
from red coral to wheat. In these data, however, some elements are missing. By cross-refer-
encing it with other sources, the traded quantities of wheat seem on average overestimated. 
Indeed, even if sometimes up to 200–300 mine a day of wheat were fed into the warehouses 
with a steady stock of approximately 16,000 mine – almost 1,500 tons –, at other times, in 
particular during famines or local wars, purchased supplies were barely sufficient to feed 
the local population. Moreover, the report failed to take into account the profits deriving 
from the sale of other more marginal goods and to include some cost items, the greatest 
being taxes paid to local authorities to guarantee a peaceful existence for the community 
and therefore the firm itself. They tended to grow over time up to about 30,000 Genoese lire 
per year at the end of the Seventeenth century. Even net of these charges, however, the 
business profitability as a whole remains high and such as to explain why the Lomellini would 
run it for over two centuries.46
4. Conclusions
Foreign minorities have played a crucial role in international trade. Merchants, while easy to 
identify with a specific ‘nation’, often adopted flexible strategies and moved easily in 
different scenarios, weaving networks of relations that went beyond their own group (Crespo 
Solana, 2010; Antunes, 2004). The Genoese merchants analysed in the two case studies fully 
reflect this interpretation: a dominating minority in Sicily and a religious minority in Tabarka 
operating under a ‘corporate’ strategy in a ‘colonial’ enclave.
Widespread Genoese presence in all major European cities and their ability to diversify 
into multi-sectoral businesses, such as trade, finance and land ownership, points to the 
existence of a common model, defined by Giorgio Doria as the ‘Genoa system’ (Doria, 1995, 
p. 109). It was based on the ability of a compact and relatively small group of patricians to 
develop different business strategies to seise market opportunities. The Genoese were prob-
ably the mercantile and financial community best equipped to operate in a polycentric 
political structure like the Spanish monarchy (Grafe, 2017). They were able to take advantage 
of cultural and institutional factors, which often placed them in a privileged position with 
respect to the other minorities and local businessmen. The Spanish administrative structure 
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made it difficult to apply mercantilist policies as incisive as those adopted by England and 
France (Brilli & Sanchez, 2019, pp. 2–3). This favoured the development of foreign merchants’ 
networks. The Genoese, in particular, established what has been called a ‘merchant empire’, 
which expanded simultaneously and symbiotically within the Spanish empire (Dauverd, 
2014, pp. 2–3). The Genoese funded Spain’s expansionist policies and in return they obtained 
formal or informal privileges that allowed them to set up operational bases from which they 
could profitably carry out their business. As underlined by R. Lopez, and as we have seen in 
this study, their expansion into the Spanish dominions did not lead to the foundation of 
colonies that were politically under the control of the Republic of Genoa. The Spanish Crown 
intended to preserve the integrity of the Empire while the Genoese were interested in a 
colonisation based only on economic power (Lopez, 1938). It was a «discreet and sophisti-
cated rule» (Braudel, 1984, p. 157).
Grain trade was a primary sector in Genoese business strategies, a sector in which they could 
take advantage of their financial relations with the Court of Spain to achieve significant privileges. 
From the Sicilian ports, they were able to manage high volume of exports to Genoa in almost 
total monopoly. In Tabarka, under Spanish protection, they were cross-cultural brokers skilled 
at doing business in Muslim markets and under Muslim rules. They were ‘wanted migrants’; the 
local authorities tolerated the activity of Lomellini’s firm, while in Sicily Genoese merchants 
established a dominant position under the Spanish rule also thanks to their ability to integrate 
into local communities (Dauverd, 2015, pp. 95–101). Although not comparable from a quanti-
tative point of view, the two cases have many points of contact. Both in Tabarka, where they 
were an ethnic and religious minority, and in Sicily, where they were a dominating minority, the 
elements underlying their activity and the profitable management of the grain trade are the 
same. The military weakness of the Republic of Genoa made the Genoese unharmful ‘guests’. 
At the same time, Genoese patriciate’s financial power allowed them to assert their interests 
with the Spanish Crown. «I will let the snake sleep until I destroy the dragon»: this phrase, pro-
nounced by the Sultan Mehemed II on the eve of 1453 before seising Constantinople,47 where 
the snake refers to the Genoese and the dragon to Rome, can in general be applied to the 
attitude of foreign powers towards communities of Genoese merchants in their territories.
Notes
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Luconi (2011, pp. 150–151).
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(ASP), L’archivio del Maestro Portulano del Regno di Sicilia, 8.
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Maestro Portulano del Regno di Sicilia, 8.
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series of fideiussori per le esportazioni, see ASP, L’archivio del Maestro Portulano del Regno di 
Sicilia, 5.
 19. uRL: http://humanities-research.exeter.ac.uk/avetransrisk.
 20. Archivio di Stato di Genova (ASG), Notai Giudiziari 636, 23/08/1600.
 21. On the silk industry, see Guenzi et al. (1998).
 22. The price paid for wheat of the old harvest was generally lower compared to the average price 
of the current harvest. ASG, Notai Giudiziari 637, 04/09/1601.
 23. 1 mina equalled 90.985 kg. The Genoese lira was the accounting currency used in Genoa. It was 
equal to 8,176 grams of silver between 1590 and 1629, and it went down to 4,841 grams in 
1703. See Felloni and Pesce (1975, p. 210).
 24. In 1591, for example, prices peaked in Genoa and Catania. See Felloni (1999c, p. 1239).
 25. For a specific analysis on the Sicilian grain market in the eighteenth century, see Fazio (1993).
 26. The businesses of the Cavanna family will be the subject of forthcoming research.
 27. In only one voyage, there was also a L. Cavanna from Palermo, see ASG, NG 637, 15/05/1601.
 28. ASG, Notai Giudiziari 637, 25/10/1601.
 29. On the French presence in Capo Negro and in the Bastion and on their relations with the 
Genoese in Tabarka, see Piccinno (2008, pp. 96–106).
 30. Ferrante Gonzaga, Viceroy of Sicily, signed the first asiento in Messina on the 22nd of 
September 1542 through the broker Francesco Grimaldi, with Francesco Lomellini and 
brothers, but it never came into effect. It was replaced by a new agreement signed the fol-
lowing year. On the contracts finalized from 1543 to 1695, see Piccinno (2008, pp. 56–83) and 
Gourdin (2008, p. 158).
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 34. Archives Nationale de Paris (ANP), Marine, B/7/471, Extrait des papiers et memoires concernant 
l’Isle de Tabarca …, cc. 660–662.
16 A. IODICE AND L. PICCINNO
 35. Biblioteca Civica Berio di Genova (BGG), Sezione Conservazione, ms. XV 3 3, Registro delle lettere 
scritte à Genova d’Aurelio Spinola.
 36. Archivio Durazzo Giustiniani Genova (ADGG), reg. 938, Lettere di Tabarca, 1719–1725.
 37. Between 1719 and 1729, the Lomellini family partially left the firm. They subcontracted it to a 
new company where only Agostino Maria Lomellini had a share. The other members were 
Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, Costantino Balbi, Francesco Maria Balbi and Giovanni Battista 
Cambiaso, see Piccinno (2008, pp. 109–256).
 38. BBG, Sezione Conservazione, ms. XV 3 3, Registro delle lettere scritte à Genova d’Aurelio Spinola, c. 
49, 30/05/1684. In some cases, the Governor bartered wheat with the masters of foreign ships 
calling at Tabarka with other goods, BBG, Sezione Conservazione, ms. XV 3 3, Registro delle lettere 
scritte à Genova d’Aurelio Spinola, c. 164, 21/04/1686.
 39. As already mentioned, the duty on imported grain was 2 Genoese lire for mina.
 40. At the beginning of the 18th century, insurance premium ranged between 15,000 and 35,000 
Genoese lire.
 41. ADGG, reg. 938, Lettere di Tabarca. 1719-1725; reg. 941, Manuale di Tabarca. 1726–1731, Calcoli di 
avaria. On assessment of shipping risks from Tabarka, see Piccinno (2008, pp. 177–185). On insur-
ance premiums on the Genoese market in 17th and 18th centuries, see Iodice and Piccinno (2021).
 42. These cases have been found via the AveTransRisk advanced search by selecting ‘Tabarka’ in the 
‘Port visited’ research function. uRL: http://humanities-research.exeter.ac.uk/avetransrisk.
 43. ADGG, reg. 938, Lettere di Tabarca. 1719-1725, c. 182v, 28/12/1724.
 44. ASG, Conservatori del Mare 377, 30/04/1696, recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the ID50349.
 45. ANP, Marine, B/7/471, Renouvellement du traitté pour la ferme et la garde de l’isle de Tabarca fait 
avec les Lomelins le 31 May (6 Aôut) 1695. On this contract, see Piccinno (2019).
 46. ANP, Marine, B/7/471, Extrait des papiers et memoires concernant l’Isle de Tabarca …, cc. 
679–682.
 47. Doukas, M., Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottomans Turks. An annotated Translation of 
“Historia Turca Byzantina” by Harry J. Magoulias, Detroit, 1975 (1st ed. 1834), p. 212, cited in 
Dauverd (2015, p. 99).
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Antonio Iodice is a Ph.D. Student in History at the university of Exeter and in Economics at the 
university of Genoa (double degree). He is the author of General Average in Genoa: between 
rules and customs. In Addobbati, A., Fusaro, M., Piccinno, L. (Eds.), Sharing Risk: General Average 
and European Maritime Business (VI-XVIII Centuries), Palgrave, 2021 (forthcoming).
Luisa Piccinno is Associate Professor of Economic History at the university of Genoa. She is the 
author of The economic structure of maritime trade calling at the port of Genoa through the 
analysis of general average data (XVI-XVII Centuries). In Addobbati, A., Fusaro, M., Piccinno, L. 
(Eds.) Sharing Risk: General Average and European Maritime Business (VI-XVIII Centuries), 
Palgrave, 2021 (forthcoming).
Funding
Research for this essay was funded by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European 
union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program, ERC Grant agreement No. 724544: 




Battilana, N. (1833). Genealogie delle famiglie nobili di Genova (Vol. III), Fratelli Pagano.
Bruna, T. (1899). I pegliesi di Tabarca e la colonia di Carloforte. Appunti storici, Tipografia Commerciale.
Di Blasi, G. E. (1842). Storia cronologica de viceré, luogotenenti e presidenti del Regno di Sicilia, Stamperia 
Oretea.
Emanuele Gaetani, F. M. (1759). Della Sicilia Nobile (Vol. III), Forni.
Testa, F. (Ed.). (1741). Capitula regni Siciliae (Vol. I), Deputazione Regia.
Vallacca, S. (1769–1787). Memorie dell’isola di Tabarca raccolte e scritte da Stefano Vallacca, nativo di 
dett’isola e da lui umiliate all’Illustrissimo e Reverendissimo Signor Monsignore Ciriaco Secchioni, 
Vescovo di Recanati e Loreto, ms. Biblioteca Reale di Torino, Manoscritti di Storia Patria, Miscellanea 900 P.
Secondary References
Abulafia, D. (1981). Southern Italy and the Florentine economy, 1265-1370. Economic History Review, 
XXXIV(2), 377–388.
Antunes, C. (2004). Globalisation in the early modern period: The economic relationship between 
Amsterdam and Lisbon, 1640-1705, Aksant: Cambridge university Press.
Arrighi, G. (2005). Hegemony unravelling -2. New Left Review, 33. Retrieved October 26, 2020, from 
https://newleftreview.org/issues/II33/articles/giovanni-arrighi-hegemony-unravelling-2
Avallone, F., Zanini, A., Ramassa, P., & Quagli, A. (2016). Accounting in international grain trade. The 
case of Nicolò Di Negro of Genoa, 1580s-1600s. In M. Sargiacomo, L. D’Amico, & R. Di Pietra (Eds.), 
Accounting and food: Some Italian experiences, Routledge (pp. 279–301).
Aymard, M., & Giarrizzo, G. (Ed.). (1987). Storia d’Italia. La Sicilia, Einaudi.
Barciela Lopez, C., Di Vittorio, A., & Macias Hernandez, A. M. (Eds.). (2007). Economia e insularidad [si-
glos XIV-XX] (2 vol.), universidad de la Laguna.
Basile, M. C. (2007). Una natio straniera nella Sicilia medievale e moderna. I privilegi del consolato di 
Genova a Palermo, Soveria Mannelli.
Blando, A. (2008). I porti del grano siciliano nel XVIII secolo. Mélanges de L’École Française de Rome, 
Antiquité, 120(2), 521–540.
Blando, N. (2003). Istituzioni e mercato nella Sicilia del grano, Puntografica.
Blockmans, W., Krom, M., & Wubs-Mrozewicz, J. (Eds.). (2017). The Routledge handbook of maritime 
trade around Europe 1300-1600, Routledge.
Boubaker, S. (1992). Les Génois de Tabarka et la Régence de Tunis au XVIIe et au début du XVIIIe siècle. 
In R. Belvederi (Ed.). Acte du IIIe congrès Rapporti Genova-Mediterraneo-Atlantico nell’età moderna, 
università di Genova, Istituto di Scienze Storiche (pp. 276–295).
Braudel, F. (1982). Civilization and capitalism, 15th-18th century, vol. II, The wheels of commerce, William 
Collins Sons & Co.
Braudel, F. (1984). Civilization and capitalism, 15th-18th century, vol. III, The perspective of the world, 
William Collins Sons & Co.
Braudel, F. (1976). Civiltà e imperi del Mediterraneo nell’età di Filippo II (Vol. I), Einaudi.
Brilli, C., & Sanchez, M. H. (Eds.). (2019). Italian merchants in the early-modern Spanish Monarchy: 
Business relations, identities and political resources, Routledge.
Calabrese, M. C. (2018). Figli della città. Consoli genovesi a Messina in età moderna, Franco Angeli.
Calafat, G., & Kaiser, W. (2014). The economy of ransoming in the early modern Mediterranean. A form 
of cross-cultural trade between Southern Europe and the Maghreb (Sixteenth to eighteenth 
centuries). In F. Trivellato, L. Halevi, & C. Antunes (Eds.), Religion and trade, cross-cultural exchanges 
in world history, 1000-1900, Oxford university Press (pp. 108–130).
Cancila, O. (1980). Imprese redditi mercato nella Sicilia moderna, Laterza.
Carrino, A., & Salvemini, B. (2006). Porti di campagna, porti di città. Traffici e insediamenti del Regno di 
Napoli visti da Marsiglia (1710-1846). Quaderni Storici, 41(121), 209–254.
Corrao, P. (1994). Mercanti stranieri e regno di Sicilia. Sistema di protezione e modalità di radicamento 
nella società cittadina. In M. Del Treppo (Ed.), Sistema di rapporti ed élites economiche in Europa 
(secoli XII-XVI), Liguori (pp. 87–112).
18 A. IODICE AND L. PICCINNO
Crespo Solana, A. (2010). Comunidades transnacionales: Comunidades de mercaderes extranjero en el 
mundo atlantico (1500-1830), Doce Calles.
Dauverd, C. (2006). Genoese and Catalans: Trade Diaspora in early modern Sicily. Mediterranean 
Studies, 15, 42–61.
Dauverd, C. (2014). Imperial ambition in the early modern Mediterranean: Genoese Merchants and the 
Spanish Crown, Cambridge university Press.
Dauverd, C. (2015). Cultivating differences: Genoese trade identity in the Constantinople of Sultan 
Mehmed II, 1453–81. Mediterranean Studies, 23(2), 94–124.
Doria, G. (1995). Conoscenza del mercato e sistema informativo: Il know-how dei mercanti-finanzieri 
genovesi nei secoli XVI e XVII. In G. Doria (Ed.), Nobiltà e investimenti a Genova in età moderna, 
Istituto di Storia Economica (pp. 91–156).
Epstein, S. (1992). An island for itself. Economic development and social change in late medieval Sicily.
Fazio, I. (1993). La politica del grano. Annona e controllo del territorio in Sicilia nel Settecento, Franco 
Angeli.
Felloni, G., & Pesce, G. (1975). Le monete genovesi. Storia, arte ed economia nelle monete di Genova dal 
1139 al 1814, Stringa.
Felloni, G. (1999a). La storiografia marittima su Genova in età moderna. In G. Felloni (Ed.), Scritti di 
storia economica, Società Ligure di Storia Patria (Vol. 2, pp. 861–878).
Felloni, G. (1999b). una fonte inesplorata per la storia dell’economia marittima in età moderna: i 
calcoli di avaria. In G. Felloni (Ed.), Scritti di Storia Economica, Società Ligure di Storia Patria (Vol. 2, 
pp. 843–860).
Felloni, G. (1999c). Prezzi e popolazione in Italia nei secoli XVI-XIX. In G. Felloni (Ed.), Scritti di Storia 
Economica, Società Ligure di Storia Patria (Vol. 2, pp. 1231–1288).
Giuffrida, A. (1999). La finanza pubblica nella Sicilia del ‘500, Sciascia.
Gourdin, P. (2008). Tabarka. Histoire et archéologie d’un préside espagnol et d’un comptoir génois et terre 
africaine (XVe-XVIIIe siècle), École française de Rome.
Grafe, R. (2017). Distant tyranny: Polycentric state-building and fiscal systems in Spain 1650–1800. In 
K. Beguin (Ed.), State cash resources and state building in Europe 13th-18th centuries, Institut de la 
gestion publique et du développement économique.
Grendi, E. (1968). Traffico portuale, naviglio mercantile e consolati genovesi nel Cinquecento. Rivista 
Storica Italiana, 80(3), 593–638.
Grendi, E. (1970). Genova alla metà del Cinquecento: una politica del grano?. Quaderni Storici, 5 (13), 
106–160.
Grendi, E. (1971). I nordici e il traffico del porto di Genova: 1590-1666. Rivista Storica Italiana, LXXXIII(1), 
23–71.
Guenzi, A., Massa, P., & Piola Caselli, F. (Eds.). (1998). Guilds, markets and work regulations in Italy, 
16th–19th centuries, Routledge.
Harlaftis, G., Zacharov, V., & Katsiardi-Hering, O. (Eds.). (2012). Merchant colonies in the early modern 
period, Routledge.
Iodice, A., & Piccinno, L. (2021). Shipping risk. General average and marine insurance in erarly mod-
ern Genoa. In P. Hellwege & G. Rossi (Eds.), Risk and insurance law in history, Duncker & Humblot, 
pp. 83–109.
Jarvis, A., & Lee, R. (Eds.). (2008). Trade, migration and urban networks in port cities, c. 1640-1940, 
Oxford university Press.
Kirk, T. A. (2005). Genoa and the sea. Policy and power in an early modern maritime republic, 1559-1684, 
John Hopkins university Press.
Kuncevic, L. (2017). The maritime trading network of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) from the fourteenth to the 
sixteenth century. In W. Blockmans, M. Krom, & J. Wubs-Mrozewicz (Eds.), The Routledge handbook 
of maritime trade around Europe 1300-1600: Commercial networks and urban autonomy, Routledge 
(pp. 141–158).
Lamberti, M. C. (1972). Mercanti tedeschi a Genova nel XVII secolo: l’attività della compagnia Raynolt 
negli anni 1619-20. Atti Della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, Nuova Serie, XII(1), 71–121.
Laudani, S. (1996). La Sicilia della seta. Economia, società e politica, Meridiana Libri.
BuSINESS HISTORy 19
Laudani, S. (2008). Dai «magazzinieri» ai «contrascrittori»: il sistema dei «caricatori» nella Sicilia d’età 
moderna tra mutamenti e continuità. Mélanges de L’École Française de Rome. Italie et Méditerranée, 
120(2), 477–490. https://doi.org/10.3406/mefr.2008.10559
Ligresti, D. (2006). Sicilia aperta (secoli XV-XVII). Mobilità di uomini e idee, Quaderni Mediterranea.
Lo Basso, L. (2007). Economie e culture del mare: armamento, navigazione, commerci. In G. Assereto 
& M. Doria (Eds.), Storia della Liguria, Laterza (pp. 76–86).
Lo Basso, L. (2015). Diaspora e armamento marittimo nelle strategie economiche dei genovesi nella 
seconda metà del XVII secolo: una storia globale. Studi Storici, 1, 137–155.
Lopez, R. S. (1938). Storie delle colonie genovesi nel Mediterraneo, Nicola Zanichelli.
Luconi, S. (2011). The pitfalls of the “italian diaspora”. The Italian American Archive, 1(2), 147–176.
Macrì, G. (2010). Il grano di Palermo fra ‘500 e ‘600: Prerogative e reti d’interesse. Mediterranea, Ricerche 
Storiche, VII(18), 87–110.
Mantran, R. (1977). North Africa in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In P. M. Holt, A. K. S. 
Lambton, & B. Lewis (Eds.), The Cambridge history of Islam (Vol. II, pp. 238–265).
Masi, G. (2014). Maritime trade from Ragusa (Dubronik) to western Europe during the 16th and 17th 
century. In D. Couto, F. Gunergun, & M. P. Pedani (Eds.), Seapower, technology and trade, Piri Reis 
university (pp. 275–280).
O’Rourke, K. H., & Williamson, J. G. (2002). When did globalisation begin?European Review of Economic 
History, 6(1), 23–50. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1361491602000023
Perrson, K. G. (2004). Grain Markets in Europe, 1500-1900. Integration and deregulation, Cambridge 
university Press.
Petralia, G. (1994). La nuova Sicilia tardomedievale: un commento al libro di Epstein. Revista D’Historia 
Medieval, 5, 137–161.
Piccinno, L. (2008). Un’impresa fra terra e mare. Giacomo Filippo Durazzo e soci a Tabarca, Franco Angeli.
Piccinno, L. (2011). Rischi di viaggio nel commercio marittimo del XVIII secolo. In M. Cini (Ed.), Traffici 
commerciali, sicurezza marittima, guerra di corsa. Il Mediterraneo e l’Ordine di Santo Stefano, ETS 
(pp. 159–179).
Piccinno, L. (2019). Alleanze, conflittualità e diplomazia tra Genova e la Spagna: i contratti di asien-
to per la gestione di Tabarca (1542-1695). In M. Doria, L. Piccinno, G. L. Podestà, M. S. Rollandi, & 
A. Zanini (Eds.), Le vocazioni di un territorio. Saggi di storia economica per Paola Massa, De Ferrari 
(pp. 15–42).
Piccinno, L., & Zanini, A. (2019). Genoa: Colonizing and colonized city? The Port City as a pole of attrac-
tion for foreign merchants (16th-18th centuries). In G. Nigro (Ed.), Maritime networks as a factor in 
European integration, Firenze university Press (pp. 281–296).
Polanyi, K. (Ed.). (1978). Traffici e mercati negli antichi imperi (1st ed. 1957), Einaudi.
Romeo, R. (1978). Storia della Sicilia, Commercio Estero (Vol. VII), Società Editrice Storia di Napoli e del-
la Sicilia.
Salvemini, B. (Ed.), (2009). Lo spazio tirrenico nella grande trasformazione. Merci, uomini e istituzioni nel 
Settecento e nel primo Ottocento, Edipuglia.
Sciuti Russi, V. (1983). Astrea in Sicilia: il ministero togato nella società siciliana dei secoli XVI e XVII, 
Jovene.
Trasselli, C. (1965). Note sui ragusei in Sicilia. Economia e Storia, I, 40–79.
Trasselli, C. (1972). I genovesi e la Sicilia durante la guerra dei Trent’anni. Rivista Storica Italiana, IV, 
978–987.
Trasselli, C. (1977). Mediterraneo e Sicilia all’inizio dell’epoca moderna (ricerche quattrocentesche), 
Pellegrini.
Trivellato, F. (2009). The Familiarity of Strangers: the Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and Cross-cultural 
Trade in the Early Modern Period, yale university Press.
